Energy & Utilities Readiness
In power generation and utilities, a cyber crisis can cross IT, OT, control systems and operations. CyberUP prepares cyber teams, IT/OT, control room teams and leadership to protect what must keep running.
The response context
Operational context
Generation, networks, OT / ICS, control rooms and service dependencies share one operating context. The response needs to be exercised around the processes the organisation must preserve.
Maintain operational capability, control and decision-making priorities during a cyber event.
Where present, SCADA systems form part of the ICS scope. Control systems, networks and operations require a shared understanding of dependencies.
A systems event may require joint decisions on containment, processes and service continuity.
The technical response is exercised alongside control room decisions, operational priorities and leadership coordination.
Scope, dependencies and priorities are defined with the organisation. Power generation and utilities do not share one uniform readiness profile.
Incident / Crisis Response
Cyber, IT/OT and control room teams need to connect events in systems with changes in operations. The exercise tests how they build a shared picture and keep the response coherent.
SOC and cyber teams gather initial evidence and flag events that may affect energy systems and services.
Cyber, IT/OT and operations teams assess initial information against the processes involved and service dependencies.
Technical evidence is correlated with the state of control systems and operations, distinguishing verified facts from issues still to be clarified.
Impact and uncertainties are shared with the responsible functions according to the organisation’s thresholds, mandates and procedures.
Cyber and IT/OT teams work with control room and operations teams so that containment decisions account for process and service conditions.
Recovery, restart sequencing and responsibilities are aligned with operating conditions and energy service continuity.
Activities may overlap and repeat. Thresholds, priorities and the involvement of each function depend on the scenario and the organisation’s procedures, not a universal timetable.
Responsibilities to exercise
Expertise remains distinct, but technical evidence, operating conditions and priorities need to be clear to those responding and those making decisions.
Cyber + IT/OT readiness
Cyber, IT and OT teams practise detection, investigation and containment without losing sight of the industrial context. ICS analysis includes SCADA where relevant.
Control room + Operations
Control room teams, operations and leadership practise priorities, decisions and actions that support service continuity, sharing operating conditions with cyber teams.
The control room contributes to understanding the event and making decisions throughout the response, not only during recovery. Roles and mandates are agreed for the organisation’s context.
Exercise Lifecycle
The scenario connects the cyber threat, IT/OT environment, control room and business continuity. The focus is the energy process and service that must remain under control.
Define the energy process, systems, dependencies, responsibilities and exercise objectives.
Introduce a realistic event within the agreed exercise scope.
Exercise cyber response, control room decisions, containment and continuity together.
Oversee the exercise and observe evidence, coordination and the consistency of decisions.
Turn gaps and debrief observations into improvement priorities and actions.
The White Team oversees the entire exercise. Control makes this cross-cutting role explicit; it does not mark the point at which oversight begins.
Industrial Business Continuity
Business continuity needs to work while cyber teams, OT, operations and leadership manage containment, process control and recovery. The exercise makes the connections between them observable.
Service continuity
The response is observed where technical security, the industrial environment and service continuity meet.
Process conditions, dependencies and operational priorities must remain visible in containment decisions.
Operational recovery
Restart sequencing, communications and responsibilities are exercised as parts of the same scenario, not as an activity separate from the response.
Cyber and operations teams examine how recovery decisions account for system conditions and the services to restore.
Exercising dependencies
Cyber Arena
The Cyber Arena enables exercises involving IT/OT systems and processes, with observation of the joint response by cyber teams, control room teams, operations and leadership, in an environment isolated or segregated from the client’s production network.
Scope and conditions
In dedicated solutions, energy systems, processes and dependencies are selected within the project scope. SCADA may be included as an ICS system where relevant. Training Arena uses generic CyberUP environments, not a dedicated replica of the organisation’s systems.
The exercise environment is isolated or segregated from the client’s production network. Connectivity for remote access, support and updates is controlled according to the configuration. This does not mean absolute isolation from every network or from external threats.
Technical response, control room coordination, decisions and recovery are observed against agreed objectives. Evidence relates to the exercise scope and conditions; it does not guarantee continuity of the real infrastructure.
Explore the environment, scope and exercise formats.
Energy & Utilities
We start with critical processes, IT/OT environments, the control room and operational dependencies to build a readiness programme that reflects your infrastructure.
A discussion focused on power generation, utilities, networks, OT / ICS and energy service continuity. Email us directly or fill in the form below.
Email us directly or fill in the form below: we’ll get back to you.
Email us: info@cyberupinstitute.com
Your current interest: Energy & Utilities
